Seven practical labs that mirror real GRC analyst work — risk registers, compliance mapping, policy writing, vendor audits, and more.
Three tiers of lab environment — browser-only tools, local Docker stack, and cloud-hosted — all mapped to the 13 labs. Pick the tier that fits your setup and start immediately.
Purpose-built GRC simulator — risk registers, control libraries (ISO 27001, NIST CSF, SOC 2, GDPR, PCI DSS pre-loaded), evidence repository, incident tracking. Designed for portfolio building.
50+ interactive simulation slides with instant feedback. No login. Includes a lab generator (Claude/ChatGPT powered) that creates custom GRC scenarios in 5 minutes. Open-source and SCORM compatible.
All workbook templates are spreadsheet-native. Create one workbook with tabs: Assets | Risk Register | Gap Assessment | Exception Register | Vendor Questionnaire | Audit Evidence. Use this from day one.
Official NIST browser tool — browse CSF 2.0 functions, categories, and subcategories. Filter by function, export to CSV, view cross-references to ISO 27001, NIST 800-53, and CIS Controls. Essential for Labs 3 and 13.
AI-first GRC tool built for ISO 42001 and EU AI Act compliance. AI system inventory, risk assessment, and control mapping. Cloud demo environment — no install needed to explore. Perfect for Lab 11.
Ideal for policy writing (Lab 4), DPIA documentation (Lab 7), BCP/DR plans (Lab 9), and the Capstone report (Lab 10). Search "risk register" or "compliance tracker" in Notion's template gallery for ready-made GRC templates.
Lightweight, fast-to-deploy GRC platform with outstanding cross-framework mapping. ISO 27001, NIST CSF 2.0, SOC 2, GDPR, ISO 42001 all pre-loaded. One control test can satisfy multiple frameworks simultaneously — exactly what Lab 12 demonstrates. Best first tool to install.
Use for: Labs 1 (compliance program), 3 & 13 (gap assessment — CSF pre-loaded), 6 (audit evidence), 11 (ISO 42001 AI governance), 12 (cross-framework mapping)
Mature, audit-ready GRC platform. More feature-complete than CISO Assistant — covers assets, risk management, policies, third-party risk, compliance packages, internal audits, and incident management all in one tool. Heavier but more representative of enterprise GRC platforms.
Use for: Labs 1 (assets + controls), 2 (risk register), 4 (policy management), 5 (third-party risk), 7 (GDPR/DPIA), 8 (exception tracking), 9 (BCP module)
Open-source security incident response platform. Bridges the GRC and IR workbooks — track policy exceptions as Cases, log security incidents, gather evidence, and maintain a full audit trail. Create a custom "Policy Exception" case template for Lab 8.
Use for: Lab 8 (exception register as Cases), Lab 6 (audit evidence attached to cases), IR Workbook integration
docker compose stop one tool before starting another. All data persists in Docker volumes between restarts.
Host your GRC tools on a cloud VM for 24/7 access from any device. Also lets you practice Lab 12's CCM using real AWS services (Config, CloudTrail, IAM) rather than simulated ones.
| Lab | Topic | Tier 1 (Browser) | Tier 2 (Docker) | Tier 3 (Cloud) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Mini Compliance Program | GRC Practice LabSheets | CISO AssistantEramba | CISO Asst (EC2) |
| 02 | Risk Register | GRC Practice LabSheets | Eramba Risk | Eramba (EC2) |
| 03 | Gap Assessment (CSF) | NIST CSF ToolSheets | CISO Assistant | CISO Asst (EC2) |
| 04 | Policy Writing | NotionGoogle Docs | Eramba Policies | Eramba (EC2) |
| 05 | Vendor Risk Assessment | SheetsVirusTotal | Eramba 3rd Party | Eramba (EC2) |
| 06 | Audit Evidence Pack | GRC Practice Lab | CISO AsstEramba Audits | CISO Asst (EC2) |
| 07 | DPIA | NotionGRC Practice Lab | Eramba GDPR pkg | Eramba (EC2) |
| 08 | Exception Management | SheetsNotion | TheHive Cases | TheHive (EC2) |
| 09 | BCP / DR Planning | NotionSheets | Eramba BCP | Eramba (EC2) |
| 10 | Capstone Review | GRC Practice LabSlides | All tools | All tools (EC2) |
| 11 | AI Governance / ISO 42001 | VerifyWise demoSheets | VerifyWise DockerCISO Asst | VerifyWise (EC2) |
| 12 | CCM | AWS Config (free acct) | AWS Config rulesCISO Asst API | AWS Config + CloudTrail |
| 13 | NIST CSF 2.0 / Govern | NIST CSF 2.0 ToolSheets | CISO Assistant | CISO Asst (EC2) |
Click each item to mark it done before starting Lab 1.
Build a scoped compliance environment for a fictional company — asset inventory, control selection, and a gap register.
Write 2–3 sentences describing which systems, locations, and data are in scope. For FinTrack: payment processing platform, customer database, employee laptops, cloud infrastructure (AWS).
Create a spreadsheet with columns: Asset Name | Asset Type | Owner | Classification (Public / Internal / Confidential / Restricted) | Location. Populate at least 10 fictional assets for FinTrack (e.g., PostgreSQL customer DB, Stripe API integration, employee MacBooks).
Use ISO 27001:2022 Annex A. It has 93 controls across 4 themes (Organisational, People, Physical, Technological). Create a tab in your spreadsheet and list each control with its reference (e.g., A.5.1 — Policies for information security).
For each control, assign: Not Started / Partial / Implemented / Not Applicable. Since FinTrack is a new program, most will be Not Started — that's fine and realistic.
Sort your control list by those marked "Not Started" that are highest-risk or required for certification. These become your Gap Register. Add columns: Gap Description | Risk if Unaddressed | Priority (High / Medium / Low) | Owner | Target Date.
Group the gap items into monthly milestones (e.g., Month 1: write policies; Month 2: conduct risk assessment; Month 3: deploy technical controls). This becomes the project plan you'd present to leadership.
Asset Name | Type | Owner | Classification | Location | Notes ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Customer DB (Prod) | Database | Engineering | Restricted | AWS RDS | Contains PII Payment API | Application | Engineering | Confidential | AWS ECS | PCI scope Employee Laptops | Hardware | IT | Internal | Office/Remote| 38 units AWS S3 Logs Bucket | Storage | Engineering | Internal | AWS S3 | 90-day retention Slack Workspace | SaaS | IT | Internal | Cloud | SSO enforced? → Add at least 10 rows. Mark PII-containing assets clearly.
Control Ref | Control Name | Status | Gap Description | Priority | Owner | Due ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── A.5.1 | InfoSec Policies | Not Started | No written policies exist | High | CISO | M1 A.5.10 | Acceptable Use of Assets | Not Started | No AUP published to staff | High | HR/IT | M1 A.8.8 | Mgmt of Technical Vulns | Partial | Patch cycle ad-hoc, no SLA | High | DevOps | M2 A.6.3 | Information Security Aware | Not Started | No security training program | Medium | HR | M3 → Continue for all identified gaps.
Identify, score, and treat information security risks using a structured risk assessment methodology.
For each asset from Lab 1, brainstorm realistic threats. Use the STRIDE model as a prompt: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege. Aim for 15 risk entries.
Rate each risk's Likelihood and Impact on the 1–5 scale. Multiply to get the Inherent Risk Score. Be honest — use the worst-case realistic scenario, not the absolute worst case.
For each risk, note any controls already in place (e.g., "MFA enabled on AWS console"). If there are none, write "None".
Re-score the risk with existing controls factored in. This is the Residual Risk Score that the organisation currently carries.
Assign Mitigate / Accept / Transfer / Avoid. For all "Mitigate" entries, write the proposed control action. For "Accept," document the business justification.
Every risk entry must have a Risk Owner (the person accountable, not just responsible). Set a review date for each risk — quarterly for High/Critical, annually for Low/Medium.
Draw a 5×5 grid (Likelihood on Y axis, Impact on X axis) and plot each risk by its residual score. Colour-code zones: green (low), yellow (medium), orange (high), red (critical). This is your Board-ready visual.
ID | Asset | Threat | Vuln | L | I | Inherent | Controls | L | I | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Due ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── R01 | Customer DB | SQL Injection | Input not sanitised | 3 | 5 | 15 HIGH | WAF deployed | 2 | 5 | 10 MED | Mitigate | Dev Lead | Q1 R02 | Employee Laptops| Phishing / Credential Theft | No security awareness | 4 | 4 | 16 HIGH | None | 4 | 4 | 16 HIGH | Mitigate | HR/IT | M1 R03 | AWS S3 Bucket | Misconfigured public access | Manual config process | 2 | 5 | 10 MED | Config audits | 1 | 5 | 5 LOW | Accept | DevOps | Q2 R04 | Payment API | Third-party breach (Stripe) | Vendor dependency | 2 | 5 | 10 MED | Contract + cyber | 1 | 4 | 4 LOW | Transfer | Legal | Annual → L = Likelihood 1-5, I = Impact 1-5. Add at least 15 risk rows.
Evaluate where a fictional organisation sits against the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and produce a prioritised improvement plan.
The NIST CSF organises security into 5 Functions, each containing Categories and Subcategories. Your job is to rate HealthBridge's current capability against each Function.
| Function | What it covers | Example subcategory |
|---|---|---|
| Identify (ID) | Asset management, risk assessment, governance | ID.AM-1: Inventory of physical devices |
| Protect (PR) | Access control, training, data security, maintenance | PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials managed |
| Detect (DE) | Anomalies, continuous monitoring, detection processes | DE.CM-1: Network is monitored for events |
| Respond (RS) | Incident response planning, communications, mitigation | RS.RP-1: IR plan is executed during/after |
| Recover (RC) | Recovery planning, improvements, communications | RC.RP-1: Recovery plan executed |
The official list is at nist.gov/cyberframework. For this lab, you can use the 5 Functions with their top-level Categories (approximately 23 categories total).
Use: 0 = Not Implemented | 1 = Initial (ad-hoc) | 2 = Developing (defined but inconsistent) | 3 = Defined (documented and practiced) | 4 = Managed (measured) | 5 = Optimised (continuous improvement).
Given the scenario (no formal program, recent ransomware), most Identify and Protect scores will be 0–1. Respond and Recover may be slightly higher if they managed to recover from the ransomware. Be realistic.
Given their size and sector (healthcare), a realistic 12-month target for most categories is 2–3. Note the gap (Target – Current).
Rank categories by gap size. Cross-reference with the Risk Register (Lab 2 concept) — the largest gaps that relate to the highest risks get priority.
Summarise: overall maturity score (average across all categories), the top 3 critical gaps, and the recommended first 90 days of action. No jargon — this goes to clinic leadership, not security engineers.
Function | Category | Current (0-5) | Target (0-5) | Gap | Priority | Notes / Evidence ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── IDENTIFY | ID.AM – Asset Management | 0 | 3 | 3 | HIGH | No asset inventory exists IDENTIFY | ID.RA – Risk Assessment | 0 | 3 | 3 | HIGH | No formal RA ever done IDENTIFY | ID.GV – Governance | 1 | 3 | 2 | HIGH | No InfoSec policy PROTECT | PR.AC – Access Control | 1 | 4 | 3 | HIGH | Shared admin passwords reported PROTECT | PR.AT – Awareness Training | 0 | 3 | 3 | MEDIUM | No training program DETECT | DE.CM – Continuous Monitoring | 0 | 2 | 2 | HIGH | No SIEM or alerting RESPOND | RS.RP – Response Planning | 1 | 3 | 2 | HIGH | Informal response; no IR plan RECOVER | RC.RP – Recovery Planning | 1 | 3 | 2 | MEDIUM | Backups exist, untested → Complete all 23 NIST CSF categories. Calculate average Current and Target scores.
Draft a complete, enforceable Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) and an Information Security Policy aligned to ISO 27001 Annex A.
This is the top-level document. It should state the organisation's commitment to information security, assign overall accountability (CISO or equivalent), and reference subordinate policies. Target: 1–2 pages.
This governs how staff may use company systems and data. Cover: permitted use, prohibited activities, personal device rules (BYOD), internet/email use, password requirements, consequences of violation. Target: 2–3 pages.
Policy Name | Version | Owner | Approved By | Approval Date | Next Review Date | Classification.
Create a one-line mapping table at the end of each policy (e.g., AUP section 3.2 → A.5.10 Acceptable Use of Assets).
Describe how staff can request an exception if they genuinely cannot comply with a policy requirement. Include: who approves, what documentation is needed, and how exceptions are tracked (this feeds your exception register).
FINTRACK LTD — ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY ────────────────────────────────────────── Version: 1.0 Owner: Head of IT / CISO Approved By: CEO — [Name] Date: [Date] Next Review: [Date + 1 year] Classification: Internal ────────────────────────────────────────── 1. PURPOSE This policy defines acceptable use of FinTrack's information systems, networks, and data by all employees, contractors, and third parties. 2. SCOPE Applies to: All staff, contractors, and any third party accessing FinTrack systems. 3. ACCEPTABLE USE 3.1 Systems are provided for business purposes. Incidental personal use is permitted provided it does not interfere with duties or consume excessive resources. 3.2 Users must not store personal data on company systems without approval. 3.3 Users must lock their screen when leaving a workstation unattended. 4. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES Users must not: • Access, copy, or share data beyond their authorised role • Install unauthorised software on company devices • Use company systems to access illegal or inappropriate content • Share credentials with others under any circumstances 5. PASSWORDS All accounts must use passwords of ≥14 characters. MFA is mandatory for all business-critical systems. Passwords must not be reused across systems. 6. VIOLATION Violations may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination. 7. EXCEPTIONS Requests for exceptions must be submitted to [owner@fintrack.com] with business justification and approved in writing before non-compliance begins. 8. CONTROL MAPPING Section 3: ISO 27001 A.5.10 | Section 5: A.5.17 | Section 4: A.8.19, A.8.20
Create and complete a vendor security questionnaire, score the vendor's risk posture, and produce a recommendation.
Tier 1 (Critical): Processes regulated PII or has deep system access. Tier 2 (High): Accesses internal data. Tier 3 (Low): No data access. DocuStore Pro handles customer PII with bank data — this is Tier 1, triggering full assessment.
Write 3–5 questions per domain (see template below). Each question should be yes/no or multiple choice with space for evidence.
Simulate realistic vendor responses. Mix strong answers (SOC 2 certified, MFA enforced) with some gaps (no formal patch SLA, sub-processors not disclosed).
Assign each domain a score: 0 (no controls) → 3 (strong controls). Weight high-risk domains (data security, access control) more heavily.
Certain answers should be automatic escalation triggers regardless of overall score: no encryption at rest, no incident notification process, no sub-processor disclosure.
Conclude with one of: Approve / Approve with conditions / Reject. List any contractual obligations that must be included in the Data Processing Agreement (DPA).
DOMAIN 1 — Data Security Q1: Is data encrypted at rest? If so, what algorithm? → Response: Yes, AES-256 Q2: Is data encrypted in transit? → Response: Yes, TLS 1.2/1.3 Q3: Where is data physically stored? Which regions? → Response: AWS eu-west-1 (Ireland) Q4: Do you use sub-processors? Who are they? → Response: "Not disclosed" ⚠ RED FLAG DOMAIN 2 — Access Control Q1: Is MFA enforced for all admin/staff access? → Response: Yes Q2: Is access reviewed periodically? How often? → Response: Annually Q3: Is privileged access managed separately (PAM)? → Response: No formal PAM tool ⚠ DOMAIN 3 — Incident Response Q1: Do you have a documented IR plan? → Response: Yes Q2: What is your customer notification SLA for breaches? → Response: 72 hours DOMAIN 4 — Certifications & Audits Q1: Do you hold SOC 2 Type II / ISO 27001 certification? → Response: SOC 2 Type II (2023) Q2: Can you provide the most recent audit report / cert? → Response: Yes, under NDA → Add domains: Vulnerability Management, Business Continuity, Personnel Security, Physical Security
Select 5 controls from a framework, define what evidence of compliance looks like, and document how you'd test each one.
Choose a mix across themes: at least one organisational, one technological, and one people control. Suggested: A.5.1 (InfoSec Policies), A.5.17 (Auth information), A.6.3 (Awareness training), A.8.5 (Secure authentication), A.8.8 (Vulnerability management).
Explain what the control requires the organisation to do, without ISO jargon. This is the "what should be happening" baseline.
Describe step-by-step what you would do to test the control — what you'd request, who you'd interview, what system you'd query.
List the specific artefacts the auditor would need to see. Be precise: not just "a policy" but "signed PDF version 1.2 dated within the last 12 months with CEO approval signature."
For this lab, simulate the evidence. Write a short mock policy, create a fictional training completion report, produce a screenshot-style config description. This is what a GRC analyst would gather before handing off to the auditor.
An "observation" (not quite a finding) is where the control is mostly met but has a minor weakness. A "finding" (fail) is a nonconformity that must be remediated for certification.
Control Ref: A.6.3 — Information Security Awareness, Education and Training Plain Desc: All staff must receive security awareness training relevant to their role. Training must be updated regularly and completion tracked. Test Procedure: 1. Request the security awareness training curriculum and materials 2. Request training completion records for all staff (last 12 months) 3. Interview 3 randomly selected staff: "When did you last receive security training? What topics were covered?" 4. Verify the training was reviewed/updated within the last year Pass Evidence Needed: ✓ Training materials (slides/video) with a version date ✓ Completion report showing ≥95% staff completed training in last 12 months ✓ Evidence of annual curriculum review (email approval or change log) ✓ Interview notes confirming staff awareness Mock Evidence Created: - "FinTrack Security Awareness Training v2.1 — Completed March 2025" - Completion report: 37/38 staff complete (97.4%) — 1 person on leave - Interview notes: 3 staff confirmed phishing training and password policy Audit Rating: PASS ✓ → Repeat this block for all 5 selected controls
Walk through a new product feature and assess its GDPR privacy impact using a structured DPIA methodology.
Document: What personal data is used (transaction history, account details, spending categories)? Who processes it (FinTrack + AI vendor)? What is the lawful basis under GDPR (consent? legitimate interests?)? What is the purpose?
Is the data processing actually necessary for the feature to work? Could less personal data achieve the same outcome (data minimisation)? Is the retention period justified? Could users opt out?
List at least 5 risks. Consider: unauthorised access to spending data, AI model profiling leading to discrimination, data shared with third-party AI vendor without user knowledge, data retained beyond necessity, re-identification of anonymised data.
Use the same 1–5 scale from Lab 2. Add a "privacy impact" dimension: how much harm could this cause to individuals (embarrassment, financial loss, discrimination)?
For each risk, define the control measure. Examples: pseudonymise transaction data before sending to AI vendor; obtain explicit consent with a clear opt-in; include the AI vendor in the vendor assessment process (Lab 5); limit data retention to 90 days.
Write a one-paragraph summary you would send to the DPO requesting sign-off, including the residual risks after mitigation and your recommendation (proceed / proceed with conditions / do not proceed).
Compile all sections into a single DPIA document. Add: Date | Feature Name | Data Controller | DPO Sign-off | Outcome | Review Date.
SECTION 1 — PROCESSING DESCRIPTION Feature: AI-Powered Spending Insights Data Subjects: FinTrack retail customers (~12,000) Data Processed: Transaction history, merchant names, amounts, dates, account balance Lawful Basis: Legitimate interests (Art. 6(1)(f)) — under review; consent preferred Third Parties: InsightML Ltd (AI vendor, data processor, EU-based) Retention Period: Proposed: Indefinite ⚠ — under review SECTION 2 — RISK REGISTER Risk | L | I | Score | Mitigation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── AI vendor data breach | 2 | 5 | 10 | Vendor DPIA required; DPA signed Profiling leads to discrimination | 2 | 4 | 8 | Bias audit on model; human review Retention beyond necessity | 3 | 3 | 9 | 90-day hard delete policy User unaware data shared with AI | 4 | 3 | 12 | Update Privacy Notice; add consent Re-identification of pseudonymised | 1 | 5 | 5 | Pseudonymisation + k-anonymity check SECTION 3 — OUTCOME Recommendation: PROCEED WITH CONDITIONS Conditions: 1) Update Privacy Notice before launch 2) Obtain explicit opt-in consent 3) Complete vendor assessment for InsightML Ltd 4) Set 90-day transaction data retention cap DPO Sign-off: [DPO Name] — pending Review Date: 6 months post-launch or if processing changes
Build an exception register, write a formal exception request, and track compensating controls for policy non-compliance.
Reference the exact policy and section. E.g., AUP Section 5: "MFA is mandatory for all business-critical systems." The legacy server cannot enrol in MFA — this violates AUP §5.
Each request must include: Requestor name and role | System/asset affected | Policy clause breached | Business justification (why cannot comply) | Risk introduced | Proposed compensating controls | Requested duration.
Use the same Likelihood × Impact scoring from Lab 2. An exception that introduces a Critical residual risk should require CISO or Board-level approval, not just a manager sign-off.
Compensating controls are alternative safeguards that reduce the risk created by not following the policy. For the MFA exception: network isolation of the legacy server + enhanced monitoring + monthly access review.
Create an approval matrix: Low risk → Team Manager. Medium → CISO. High/Critical → CISO + Legal. Document who approved, when, and for how long.
The register tracks every active exception, its status, expiry date, and whether a resolution plan exists (e.g., "Legacy server to be decommissioned by Q3 — tracked in IT roadmap").
Go through each entry: Has the exception expired? Has the root cause been resolved? Should it be renewed, escalated, or closed? Document the review outcome.
EXCEPTION REQUEST FORM ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Exception ID: EXC-001 Date Submitted: [Date] Requestor: Alex Osei, Infrastructure Lead System / Asset: Legacy Payroll Server (WIN-PAY-01, Windows Server 2012) Policy Violated: Acceptable Use Policy v1.0, Section 5 — MFA Mandatory Business Justification: WIN-PAY-01 runs payroll software that does not support modern MFA protocols. Upgrading or replacing the software requires a 6-month procurement and migration process. Disabling the server would halt payroll processing for 200+ employees. Risk Introduced: Without MFA, a compromised credential could allow unauthorised access to payroll data including salary and bank details. Risk Score: Likelihood 2 × Impact 5 = 10 (MEDIUM) Compensating Controls: 1. WIN-PAY-01 isolated to dedicated VLAN; no internet access 2. Access restricted to 3 named accounts (monthly access review) 3. All logins logged and forwarded to SIEM with alerting 4. Physical access to server room required Requested Duration: 6 months (until payroll system migration is complete) Resolution Plan: New payroll SaaS with MFA support — procurement in progress (IT-2025-014) Approver Required: CISO (Medium risk) Approved By: [CISO Name] — [Date] Expiry Date: [Date + 6 months]
ID | Policy Clause | Asset | Risk | Comp Controls | Approver | Approved | Expiry | Status ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── EXC-001 | AUP §5 – MFA | WIN-PAY-01 | MED | VLAN iso, SIEM | CISO | 2025-01-10 | 2025-07-10 | Active EXC-002 | AUP §3 – Admin| Dev MacBook | MED | EDR enhanced | CISO | 2025-01-12 | 2025-04-12 | Active EXC-003 | AUP §3 – ProdDB| Contractor X | HIGH | Audit log, VPN | CISO+Leg| 2025-01-15 | 2025-02-15 | Active → Review all entries quarterly. Flag any approaching expiry 30 days in advance.
Perform a Business Impact Analysis, define recovery objectives, and draft a Disaster Recovery Plan for a critical system.
For HealthBridge, list all key operational processes: patient scheduling, clinical records access, prescription processing, billing, staff communications. Focus on processes that, if disrupted, directly harm patient safety or revenue.
For each process, rate the impact of disruption at four time intervals: 1 hour, 4 hours, 24 hours, 72 hours. Use a 1–5 scale: 1 = Negligible, 5 = Catastrophic (patient safety risk, regulatory breach). This determines prioritisation.
The patient scheduling system going down for 72 hours is catastrophic — so its RTO should be 4 hours maximum. The RPO should be no more than 1 hour of data loss given appointment data changes constantly.
Options include: restore from backup, failover to secondary site, use a manual paper-based workaround while IT is restored, use a cloud-hosted DR environment (hot/warm/cold standby). Select and justify the strategy that meets the RTO/RPO.
The DRP must include: trigger conditions (when is the DRP invoked?), step-by-step recovery procedure, roles and responsibilities, communication plan, rollback procedure if recovery fails, and success criteria (how do you know recovery is complete?).
A plan that has never been tested is not a plan — it's a hope. Define: tabletop test (quarterly), walkthrough test (annually), full failover test (annually). Document who owns each test and what constitutes a pass.
Process | System | 1hr | 4hr | 24hr | 72hr | RTO | RPO | Priority ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Patient Scheduling | SchedPro (SaaS) | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 hrs | 1 hr | CRITICAL Clinical Records (EHR) | HealthEHR (on-prem)| 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 hrs | 30 min | CRITICAL Prescription Processing | RxLink API | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 hrs | 2 hrs | HIGH Staff Email | Microsoft 365 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 hrs | 4 hrs | MEDIUM Billing / Finance | QuickBooks Online | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 24 hrs | 4 hrs | MEDIUM → Impact scale: 1=Negligible, 5=Catastrophic. Add all key HealthBridge processes.
DR PLAN — PATIENT SCHEDULING SYSTEM (SchedPro) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RTO: 4 hours RPO: 1 hour Recovery Strategy:Warm standby in AWS eu-west-1 (syncs every 30 min) DR Owner: IT Manager — [Name] TRIGGER CONDITIONS Invoke this DRP when SchedPro is unavailable for >30 minutes AND the vendor's support team cannot confirm resolution within 60 minutes. STEP-BY-STEP RECOVERY Step 1 [T+0:00] — IT Manager declares incident; notifies IC and clinic director Step 2 [T+0:15] — Activate manual paper-based scheduling workaround (see Annex A) Step 3 [T+0:30] — Contact SchedPro vendor; open P1 ticket; obtain status Step 4 [T+1:00] — If vendor cannot restore within 1hr, invoke AWS warm standby: a) SSH to dr-schedpro-aws.internal b) Run /opt/dr/promote_standby.sh c) Update DNS: schedpro.healthbridge.ie → DR IP Step 5 [T+2:00] — Validate DR environment: test booking creation, cancellation Step 6 [T+3:30] — Communicate restoration to all clinical staff Step 7 [T+4:00] — RTO checkpoint: if not restored, escalate to CEO + Board COMMUNICATION PLAN T+0:00 → IT team notified (PagerDuty) T+0:30 → Clinic director + reception managers notified T+2:00 → All clinical staff notified of DR status T+4:00 → Board notified if RTO breached SUCCESS CRITERIA ✓ Staff can view and create appointments in DR environment ✓ Appointment data loss does not exceed 1 hour (RPO met) ✓ System restored within 4 hours (RTO met) TEST SCHEDULE Tabletop: Quarterly (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct) Failover drill: Annually (off-hours, last Sunday of March) Owner: IT Manager
Integrate all previous labs into a cohesive GRC program review — culminating in a Board-ready security briefing and a 12-month improvement roadmap.
Create a single-page summary showing: Compliance Program maturity score (from Lab 1 + 3), number of open risks by severity (from Lab 2), Gap Assessment score (Lab 3), open policy exceptions (Lab 8), active vendor risks (Lab 5), and BCP/DR readiness status (Lab 9). Use a traffic-light (RAG) status for each domain.
From your risk register (Lab 2), pull the 5 highest residual-risk items. For each, write 2–3 sentences in plain business language — no technical jargon. Include what the risk means in business terms (financial loss, reputational damage, regulatory fine) and what's being done about it.
How many ISO 27001 controls are: Implemented / Partial / Not Started? What is the percentage complete? What is the path to certification — and what are the blockers? Translate the gap register (Lab 1) into a simple progress bar narrative.
How many vendors have been assessed (Lab 5)? How many are Tier 1? Are there any with outstanding remediation requirements? Are all critical vendors covered by a signed DPA? Flag any unassessed critical vendors as an open risk.
From Lab 8: how many exceptions are active? Which are approaching expiry? Are any at High/Critical risk with no resolution plan? The Board needs to know if any exceptions represent material risk that they should be aware of.
Build a quarter-by-quarter roadmap covering: Q1 (achieve ISO 27001 certification), Q2 (complete vendor assessment program), Q3 (close all High-risk exceptions), Q4 (conduct first full BCP failover test). Each milestone should include owner, cost estimate (even rough), and success metric.
Structure a 15-minute Board presentation: 2 min opening (purpose and scope), 5 min current state (dashboard + top 5 risks), 3 min compliance progress, 2 min vendor and exceptions, 3 min roadmap and ask (budget, headcount, or policy decisions needed from the Board).
DOMAIN | STATUS | SCORE / COUNT | TREND | NOTES ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ISO 27001 Compliance | 🟡 AMB | 58% controls met | ↑ | Certification in 3 months Risk Register | 🟠 AMB | 3 Critical, 6 High | → | 2 Critical unmitigated NIST CSF Maturity | 🟡 AMB | Avg score: 2.1 / 5 | ↑ | Detect function still 0.8 Policy Coverage | 🟢 GRN | 8 of 12 policies done| ↑ | AUP + ISP complete Vendor Risk | 🔴 RED | 3 of 9 Tier-1 assessed| ↑ | 6 unassessed vendors Open Exceptions | 🟡 AMB | 3 active (1 High) | → | EXC-001 expires in 2 weeks BCP / DR | 🔴 RED | Plan drafted, untested| ↑ | No failover test conducted Awareness Training | 🟢 GRN | 97% completion | ↑ | Annual cycle complete → 🟢 Green = On track | 🟡 Amber = Needs attention | 🔴 Red = Requires escalation
RISK 1 — Unassessed Third-Party Vendors Six of our nine critical vendors have not yet undergone a security assessment. If any of these vendors suffered a breach, FinTrack could face data exposure affecting customer payment records and potential regulatory fines of up to €20M or 4% of global turnover under GDPR. Action: Vendor assessment program to be completed by end of Q2. RISK 2 — Customer Database SQL Injection Vulnerability A vulnerability in our payment API's input validation could allow an attacker to extract customer bank account details. A WAF is in place but the underlying code fix has not been deployed. Estimated exposure: 12,000 customer records. Action: Developer fix prioritised — target: 30 days. RISK 3 — No Tested Disaster Recovery for Core Systems Our DR plan for the core payment platform exists on paper but has never been tested. In the event of a ransomware attack (similar to the HealthBridge incident), we do not have validated confidence in our ability to recover within the 4-hour RTO. Action: Failover drill scheduled for Q3. → Write risks 4 and 5 from your own Risk Register (Lab 2)
QUARTER | MILESTONE | OWNER | METRIC ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Q1 | ISO 27001 Stage 2 Audit + Certification | CISO / GRC | Cert received Q1 | Close EXC-001 (legacy payroll server) | IT Manager | Exception closed Q2 | Complete vendor assessments (all Tier 1) | GRC Analyst| 9/9 assessed Q2 | Deploy SIEM and detection rules | SecOps | NIST DE score ≥ 2.5 Q3 | Close all High-risk open exceptions | GRC / CISO | 0 High exceptions Q3 | Conduct BCP full failover test | IT Manager | RTO/RPO met in test Q4 | Annual Risk Register review | GRC Analyst| All risks re-scored Q4 | NIST CSF re-assessment (target score ≥ 3) | CISO | Avg score ≥ 3.0/5 → Each row should reference the Lab or document it relates to for traceability.
Build an AI risk register, classify AI systems by risk tier under the EU AI Act, and map controls to ISO/IEC 42001 — the AI Management System standard.
The EU AI Act entered into force in August 2024 and is now actively enforced in stages. Prohibited AI practices became enforceable in February 2025; obligations for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models applied from August 2025. Any GRC analyst working in or with EU-facing organisations must understand AI risk classification, governance obligations, and the ISO 42001 standard — which is becoming as expected as ISO 27001 was a decade ago.
| Tier | Description | Examples | Obligations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unacceptable Risk | Banned outright | Social scoring by governments, manipulative subliminal AI, real-time biometric surveillance (public) | Prohibited — cannot deploy |
| High Risk | Subject to strict obligations before market placement | Credit scoring, recruitment AI, medical devices, law enforcement, critical infrastructure | Risk management system, data governance, transparency, human oversight, conformity assessment, registration in EU database |
| Limited Risk | Transparency obligations only | Chatbots, deepfake generators, AI-generated content | Disclose AI interaction to users; label synthetic content |
| Minimal Risk | No specific obligations | Spam filters, AI in video games, recommendation engines | Voluntary codes of conduct encouraged |
List every AI system or AI-enabled feature in use (or planned). For each, record: System Name | Purpose | Data inputs | Who is affected | Vendor or in-house | Deployment status. This is your AI asset register — the starting point for all governance.
Apply the four-tier model to each of the three FinTrack AI features. The credit-scoring model is Annex III (High Risk — credit decisions affecting natural persons). The Spending Insights tool is Limited Risk. The internal HR chatbot is Limited Risk (must disclose it's AI). Document your classification rationale.
For each AI system, identify specific AI risks (bias, drift, opacity, data quality, third-party dependency). Score each risk using Likelihood × Impact × Severity of harm to individuals (add a third axis: 1 = inconvenience → 5 = physical/financial harm or discrimination).
EU AI Act Article 14 requires meaningful human oversight of High Risk AI. For the credit-scoring model: define who reviews AI-generated decisions before they affect customers, what the override process is, and how decisions are logged for auditability.
Select the 10 most relevant controls from ISO 42001 Annex A for FinTrack's AI use cases. For each control, document: current status (Implemented / Partial / Not Started), gap description, and treatment action. This becomes your AI compliance gap register.
Write a one-page AI Policy for FinTrack covering: permitted AI use cases, prohibited uses (aligned to EU AI Act Article 5), data governance requirements for AI training data, human oversight requirements, and accountability (who owns AI governance). This maps to ISO 42001 clause 5.2.
Define what constitutes an "AI incident" (e.g., model producing discriminatory outputs, unexplained decisions leading to customer harm, model drift detected). Define: detection triggers, escalation path, customer notification obligations, regulator notification (EU AI Act requires serious incident reporting), and post-incident review.
System Name | Purpose | Data Inputs | Affected Parties | Source | EU AI Act Tier | Rationale ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── CreditScore AI | Loan approval scoring | Transactions, credit hist| Customers (EU) | In-house | HIGH RISK | Annex III §5(b) — credit scoring decisions on natural persons Spending Insights | Personalised spend reports | Transaction history | Customers (EU) | Vendor ML | LIMITED RISK | No consequential decisions; transparency obligation applies HR Chatbot (internal)| Staff HR query handling | HR policy docs | Employees | Vendor SaaS| LIMITED RISK | Art. 50 — must disclose AI to users interacting with it → Add all AI systems. Re-assess tier when purpose or data inputs change.
System | Risk | L | I | Harm | Score | Treatment | Owner | ISO 42001 Control ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── CreditScore AI | Biased outputs (gender) | 3 | 5 | 5 | 75 | Bias audit quarterly; diverse dataset| Data Sci | A.6.2.4 Fairness CreditScore AI | Model drift | 3 | 4 | 4 | 48 | Monthly performance monitoring | MLOps | A.6.2.6 Performance CreditScore AI | No explainability | 4 | 4 | 4 | 64 | Implement SHAP/LIME explanations | Engineering| A.6.2.5 Transparency Spending Insight | Third-party model opacity| 2 | 3 | 3 | 18 | Vendor AI assessment (Lab 5 method)| GRC | A.8.4 Supply chain HR Chatbot | Hallucination / bad HR | 3 | 3 | 3 | 27 | Human review of novel queries | HR / IT | A.6.2.3 Human oversight → Score = L × I × Harm. Prioritise High Risk system entries first.
Control Ref | Control Name | Status | Gap / Notes | Priority ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── A.5.2 | AI Policy | Not Started | No AI policy exists | High A.6.1.2 | AI Risk Assessment Process | Partial | Risk register started (this lab) | High A.6.2.3 | Human Oversight Mechanisms | Partial | Defined for CreditScore; not documented | High A.6.2.4 | Fairness & Bias Testing | Not Started | No bias testing process in place | High A.6.2.5 | Transparency & Explainability | Not Started | No explainability tooling deployed | High A.6.2.6 | AI System Performance Monitoring | Not Started | No model drift monitoring | High A.7.4 | AI Training Data Governance | Partial | Data documented; no quality audit process | Medium A.8.4 | AI Supply Chain / Third-Party | Not Started | Vendor AI not assessed | High A.9.1 | AI Incident Detection & Reporting | Not Started | No AI incident procedure exists | High A.10.1 | Continual Improvement of AIMS | Not Started | No review cycle defined | Medium
Move beyond periodic audits — design automated control tests, understand how CCM platforms work, and build an always-on compliance posture.
Traditional GRC — gather screenshots once a year, hand them to an auditor — is being replaced. Modern GRC platforms (Vanta, Drata, Secureframe, Anecdotes, TrustCloud) connect directly to cloud environments, identity providers, and vulnerability scanners, running automated pass/fail tests against controls every day. The result is "always-on compliance" — you know your posture right now, not as of last quarter's audit. Lab 6's manual evidence gathering is still a useful skill, but this is what production looks like in 2026.
CCM automates the testable, technical controls — humans still own the rest.
For each major system FinTrack uses, identify what compliance-relevant data it can expose via API. This becomes your CCM integration map — the foundation of what can and cannot be automated.
Go through the control list from Lab 1/6. For each control, decide: Can this be tested programmatically? If yes, what data source is needed and what's the pass/fail logic? If no, document why and what evidence collection process remains manual.
For each automated control, write a test spec in the format: Control → Data Source → Test Logic → Pass Condition → Fail Condition → Alert Action. See the template below.
When a control test fails, what happens next? Define: Who is alerted (control owner), what SLA they have to remediate (e.g., Critical = 24 hrs, High = 7 days), how the failure is tracked (ticket in Jira/TheHive), and when it auto-escalates to the CISO.
A key benefit of CCM is that one test can satisfy multiple frameworks simultaneously. For example, a test proving "MFA is enforced for all admin accounts" satisfies: ISO 27001 A.8.5, SOC 2 CC6.1, and PCI DSS Requirement 8. Map your 8 control tests across at least two frameworks each.
Design (on paper or in a spreadsheet) what your real-time compliance dashboard would show: overall % controls passing, controls by framework, trend over the last 30 days, open failures by severity, and time-to-remediation metrics. This is what you'd present to the CISO weekly.
For non-automatable controls, write a simplified evidence collection runbook: what to collect, from whom, how often, where to store it, and how to link it to the relevant control in your GRC platform.
System / Tool | Type | Data Available via API | Controls it can test ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── AWS (IAM + Config) | Cloud Platform | IAM users, MFA status, S3 permissions, Config rules| Access ctrl, Encryption, Config mgmt Okta | Identity Provider | User MFA enrolment, session policy, app access | MFA enforcement, Access reviews GitHub | Code Repository | Branch protection, code review requirements | Change mgmt, Secure SDLC Tenable / Qualys | Vuln Scanner | CVE severity, patch status, age of open findings| Vulnerability management SLA Jira | Ticketing | Incident ticket status, SLA compliance | Incident response timeliness Jamf / Intune | MDM (Laptops) | Encryption status, OS patch level, AV installed | Endpoint security controls HR System | People Data | Employee onboarding/offboarding dates | Access revocation, Joiners/Movers/Leavers → Manual (no API): Physical security inspections, vendor interviews, policy awareness sign-offs
TEST 1 — MFA Enforcement (Admin Accounts) Control: ISO 27001 A.8.5 / SOC 2 CC6.1 / PCI DSS 8.4 Data Source: Okta API — list all users with admin role Test Logic: For each admin user: check mfa_enrolled = true AND mfa_factor_type ≠ SMS Pass Condition: 100% of admin users have MFA enrolled (non-SMS) Fail Condition: Any admin user with mfa_enrolled = false OR mfa_factor_type = SMS Alert Action: Notify IT Admin within 1 hour; auto-create Jira ticket; CISO if not resolved in 24hrs Frequency: Every 6 hours TEST 2 — S3 Bucket Public Access Control: ISO 27001 A.8.9 / SOC 2 CC6.6 Data Source: AWS Config — S3 bucket ACL and bucket policy Test Logic: For each S3 bucket: check block_public_access = true AND no public bucket policy Pass Condition: Zero S3 buckets with public read or write access Fail Condition: Any bucket with public access enabled Alert Action: Notify DevOps immediately; CRITICAL ticket; CISO notified same day Frequency: Every 1 hour TEST 3 — Critical Vulnerability Patch SLA Control: ISO 27001 A.8.8 / SOC 2 CC7.1 Data Source: Tenable API — CVE severity, discovery date, patch date Test Logic: For CVE severity = Critical: (today - date_discovered) must be ≤ 7 days Pass Condition: All Critical CVEs patched within 7 days of discovery Fail Condition: Any unpatched Critical CVE older than 7 days Alert Action: Daily digest to DevOps Lead; escalate to CISO at day 10 Frequency: Daily → Write TEST 4 (Offboarding: access revoked within 24hrs of HR termination date) → Write TEST 5 (Encryption at rest: all RDS instances encrypted) → Write TEST 6 (Code review: no direct commits to main branch without PR approval) → Write TEST 7 (Laptop disk encryption: 100% of managed devices show FileVault/BitLocker on) → Write TEST 8 (Logging: CloudTrail enabled in all AWS regions)
Test Name | ISO 27001 | SOC 2 | PCI DSS | NIST CSF 2.0 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── MFA Enforcement (Admin) | A.8.5 | CC6.1 | Req 8.4 | PR.AC-7 S3 Public Access | A.8.9 | CC6.6 | Req 3.5 | PR.DS-1 Critical Vuln Patch SLA | A.8.8 | CC7.1 | Req 6.3 | DE.CM-8 Offboarding Access Revoke | A.5.18 | CC6.2 | Req 8.2 | PR.AC-1 Encryption at Rest (RDS) | A.8.24 | CC6.7 | Req 3.5 | PR.DS-1 Code Review Required (PR) | A.8.32 | CC8.1 | Req 6.4 | PR.IP-1 → One test result = evidence across 4 frameworks simultaneously.
Perform a gap assessment against the updated NIST CSF 2.0 framework — including the new sixth function, Govern — and compare your results to the original CSF 1.1 baseline from Lab 3.
NIST released Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 in February 2024 — the first major update since the original 2014 release. The biggest change is the addition of a sixth function: Govern (GV). This formalises what was previously implied but not explicit: that security strategy, roles, risk appetite, policy, and supply chain risk management must be governed at the organisational level, not just operationally managed. CSF 2.0 also significantly expands supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) and explicitly scopes the framework for organisations of all sizes — not just critical infrastructure.
| Function | Core focus | Key categories (CSF 2.0) | New / Changed? |
|---|---|---|---|
| GV — Govern | Organisational context, risk strategy, roles, policy, supply chain oversight | GV.OC (Org Context), GV.RM (Risk Mgmt Strategy), GV.RR (Roles & Responsibilities), GV.PO (Policy), GV.OV (Oversight), GV.SC (Supply Chain) | NEW in 2.0 |
| ID — Identify | Asset management, risk assessment, improvement | ID.AM, ID.RA, ID.IM (new: Improvement) | Updated — added ID.IM |
| PR — Protect | Access, awareness, data security, platform security, resilience | PR.AA, PR.AT, PR.DS, PR.PS (new: Platform Security), PR.IR | Updated — restructured |
| DE — Detect | Continuous monitoring, adverse event analysis | DE.CM, DE.AE | Streamlined |
| RS — Respond | Incident management, analysis, mitigation, reporting | RS.MA, RS.AN, RS.CO, RS.MI | Minor updates |
| RC — Recover | Incident recovery, communication | RC.RP, RC.CO | Streamlined |
Pull up the gap assessment from Lab 3 (or use the template values). These are your baseline scores across the original five functions. You will compare these to your new CSF 2.0 scores to measure 12-month progress.
This is entirely new — there is no Lab 3 baseline to compare against. Score each GV category (0–5 maturity scale from Lab 3). For a clinic with no formal security program prior to the ransomware attack, most GV scores will reflect the work done in the past 12 months: policies written (Lab 4), roles assigned, risk appetite defined. Be realistic.
This is the most scrutinised new category in CSF 2.0. For HealthBridge: Do you have a vendor inventory? Are critical vendors assessed (Lab 5 method)? Is there a process for monitoring vendor security posture on an ongoing basis? Are fourth parties (your vendor's vendors) considered? Score each sub-category honestly.
CSF 2.0 adds ID.IM (Improvement — processes for learning from incidents and improving the program) and restructures PR into cleaner categories including PR.PS (Platform Security — covering secure configuration, software integrity, and technology infrastructure). Score these new sub-categories for HealthBridge.
Compare Lab 3 current scores to your new CSF 2.0 scores for the same categories. Calculate the delta (improvement). Which functions improved the most? Which are still lagging? Present this as a before/after comparison table.
Some gaps will be genuinely new — things CSF 1.1 didn't ask about that CSF 2.0 now explicitly requires (e.g., a formal risk appetite statement under GV.RM, a supply chain risk management plan under GV.SC). List the top 5 new gaps not in your Lab 3 assessment.
Add the new CSF 2.0 gaps to FinTrack / HealthBridge's roadmap. Prioritise GV.SC (supply chain risk) and GV.RM (risk strategy formalisation) — these are the areas auditors and regulators are paying the most attention to in 2025–2026.
Function | Category | Current (0-5) | Target | Gap | Priority | Evidence / Notes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── GOVERN GV | GV.OC – Organisational Context | 1 | 3 | 2 | HIGH | Stakeholders partially mapped; no formal context review GV | GV.RM – Risk Management Strategy | 1 | 3 | 2 | HIGH | No documented risk appetite or tolerance thresholds GV | GV.RR – Roles & Responsibilities | 2 | 3 | 1 | MED | IR roles assigned (post-incident); not formally documented GV | GV.PO – Policy | 2 | 3 | 1 | MED | AUP + ISP written (Lab 4); 4 further policies outstanding GV | GV.OV – Oversight | 1 | 3 | 2 | HIGH | No Board-level security reporting cadence established GV | GV.SC – Supply Chain Risk Mgmt | 0 | 3 | 3 | HIGH | No vendor inventory; no third-party risk process → GV.SC is the biggest new gap for most organisations. Treat it as High priority. 12-MONTH PROGRESS (CSF 1.1 vs CSF 2.0 comparable functions) Function | Lab 3 Score (CSF 1.1) | New Score (CSF 2.0) | Delta | Trend ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── IDENTIFY | 0.8 | 1.9 | +1.1 | ↑↑ PROTECT | 0.7 | 2.1 | +1.4 | ↑↑ DETECT | 0.4 | 1.2 | +0.8 | ↑ RESPOND | 1.0 | 2.4 | +1.4 | ↑↑ RECOVER | 1.1 | 2.2 | +1.1 | ↑↑ GOVERN | N/A | 1.2 | N/A | NEW → Overall average: 1.83 / 5.0 — progress from 0.8 baseline. Target: 3.0 in 12 months.
New Gap | CSF 2.0 Ref | Why it matters | Priority ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── No formal risk appetite statement | GV.RM-01 | Without one, risk decisions are inconsistent | HIGH No supply chain risk management plan | GV.SC-01 | Vendors are a primary attack vector (SolarWinds) | HIGH No Board security reporting cadence | GV.OV-01 | Board cannot provide oversight without visibility | HIGH No improvement tracking from incidents| ID.IM-01 | Lessons Learned not feeding back into controls | MEDIUM Platform security baseline undefined | PR.PS-01 | No secure config standard for servers/cloud | HIGH → These 5 gaps should all feed into the updated 12-month roadmap (Lab 10 Capstone).
At-a-glance guide to the major GRC frameworks, what they cover, and when to use each one.
| Framework | Governing Body | What it covers | Used in Labs | Free? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ISO 27001:2022 | ISO / IEC | Information Security Management System (ISMS). 93 Annex A controls across Organisational, People, Physical, and Technological themes. Certifiable. | Labs 1, 4, 6, 8 | Standard costs ~£150. Free summaries on BSI, ISMS.online |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | NIST (US) | 800+ security and privacy controls for federal systems. Highly detailed. Widely used as a control baseline even outside the US government. | Labs 1, 2 | Free at csrc.nist.gov |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) | NIST (US) | Five functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. Outcome-based, flexible, and widely adopted across industries globally. | Lab 3 | Free at nist.gov/cyberframework |
| NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1 | NIST (US) | Guide for conducting risk assessments. Defines threat sources, threat events, and a structured risk scoring methodology. | Lab 2 | Free at csrc.nist.gov |
| ISO 27005 | ISO / IEC | Information security risk management — the risk assessment companion to ISO 27001. Defines risk identification, analysis, evaluation, and treatment processes. | Lab 2 | Paid (~£100). Free summaries available |
| GDPR (EU) 2016/679 | EU / National DPAs | Data protection regulation for EU/EEA residents' personal data. Mandates lawful basis, data subject rights, breach notification (72 hrs), and DPIAs for high-risk processing. | Lab 5, 7 | Free at gdpr.eu and EUR-Lex |
| ISO 22301:2019 | ISO | Business Continuity Management System (BCMS). Covers BIA, BCP development, testing, and continual improvement. Certifiable. | Lab 9 | Standard costs ~£150. Free summaries available |
| SOC 2 (AICPA) | AICPA (US) | Trust Services Criteria across 5 categories: Security, Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, Privacy. Type I = design; Type II = operating effectiveness over time. | Lab 5, 6 | AICPA criteria free. Audit itself is costly (£20–80k) |
| PCI DSS v4.0 | PCI SSC | Payment Card Industry standard. 12 requirements covering network security, access control, monitoring, and vulnerability management for organisations that process card payments. | Labs 1, 5 | Free at pcisecuritystandards.org |
| MITRE ATT&CK | MITRE | Adversary tactics and techniques knowledge base. Useful for mapping threat intelligence to controls and identifying detection gaps in your security posture. | Lab 2 (risk identification) | Free at attack.mitre.org |
| EU AI Act (2024/1689) | European Union | World's first comprehensive AI regulation. Classifies AI systems into four risk tiers (Unacceptable, High, Limited, Minimal). High-risk AI requires conformity assessment, human oversight, and registration. Enforced in stages from Feb 2025. Fines up to €35M or 7% global turnover. | Lab 11 | Free at eur-lex.europa.eu |
| ISO/IEC 42001:2023 | ISO / IEC | AI Management System (AIMS) standard. Structures governance of AI development and deployment across 38 Annex A controls — covering AI risk assessment, fairness, transparency, human oversight, and supply chain AI governance. Certifiable. Expected to become as common as ISO 27001 in regulated sectors. | Lab 11 | Paid (~£150). Free summaries on BSI |
| DORA — Digital Operational Resilience Act (EU 2022/2554) | European Union | Mandatory for EU financial entities (banks, insurers, investment firms, fintechs) from January 2025. Requires a centralised ICT risk management framework, mandatory incident reporting, digital operational resilience testing (TLPT/pen testing), and tight third-party ICT provider oversight. Directly relevant to the FinTrack scenario used throughout this workbook. | Labs 2, 5, 9 | Free at eur-lex.europa.eu |
| NIST CSF 2.0 (Feb 2024) | NIST (US) | Major update to the original 2014 framework. Adds a sixth function — Govern (GV) — covering organisational context, risk strategy, roles, policy, oversight, and supply chain risk management. Now explicitly scoped for all organisation sizes and sectors, not just critical infrastructure. Includes expanded C-SCRM (Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management) guidance. | Lab 13 | Free at nist.gov/cyberframework |
| NIST AI RMF 1.0 (2023) | NIST (US) | AI Risk Management Framework. Organises AI governance across four functions: GOVERN, MAP, MEASURE, MANAGE. Complements ISO 42001 and the EU AI Act. Widely referenced in US federal and regulated sector AI governance programs. Includes a companion Playbook with specific actions per function. | Lab 11 | Free at nist.gov/system/files/documents/2023/01/26/AI RMF 1.0.pdf |